inherited from ancestral tradition, fostering antinomic conducts, expectations, and aspirations. This double-sidedness of objective and subjective reality threatened to undermine the efforts to socialize agriculture after independence, as the logic of decolonization inclined the educated petty bourgeoisie of bureaucrats to magically deny the contradictions of reality as shameful ghosts of a dead colonial past rather than strive to overcome them through an educative and political action guided by an adequate knowledge of the real condition of the peasantry and subproletariat of the emerging Algerian nation. ■ colonialism, war, peasantry, uprooting, space, despair, agriculture, revolution, French imperialism, Kabyle culture, Algeria God had given to the crow, who was at that time white, two bags: one filled with gold, the other full of lice.
K E Y W O R D S
The crow gave the bag full of lice to the Algerians and the bag filled with gold to the French.
It is from then that he has become black.
(Oral tradition collected at L'Arba)
Of all the disruptions that rural Algerian society underwent between 1955 and 1962, those brought about by population resettlements (regroupements) are, without any doubt, the most profound and the most fraught with long-term consequences. In a first phase, the displacements were tied to the creation of 'forbidden zones '. From 1954 '. From to 1957 , a number of peasants had been quite simply chased out of their villages; it is especially since 1957 that, in certain regions, North-Constantine for example, the policy of resettlement took a methodical and systematic form. According to an official directive, the foremost objective of the forbidden zones was 'to empty out a region not under control and to withdraw the population from rebel influence'. The massive resettlement of populations in centers located near military installations was supposed to allow the army to exercise a direct control over them, to prevent them from giving information, guidance, fresh supplies, or lodging to the soldiers of the National Liberation Army (ALN); 1 it was also supposed to facilitate the conduct of operations of repression by authorizing the consideration of any person who remained in the forbidden zones as a 'rebel'. In the near totality of cases, the expulsion was carried out by force. At first, the army seems to have applied systematically, at least in the Collo region, a scorched-earth tactic: burnings of forests, annihilation of reserves and livestock -every Many . . . must have preferred the risk of brutal death to being crammed together, to subjection, to the slow death of the straw huts, tents, and shantytowns of resettlement. . . . The women picked up by the authorities' combing of the area, by which the meshtas were for the most part destroyed, had made the forced journey four or five times, all the way to the village of the district, but they always set off again for their douar. (Talbo-Bernigaud, 1960: 711) In this first phase, the army, which was inspired by strictly strategic motivations, seems not to have had any concerns other than emptying the zones that were difficult for it to control, without troubling itself very precisely over the evacuated population, without giving themselves the explicit objective of organizing their presence, and thus their entire existence. The peasants uprooted from their customary residence were herded into vast centers whose location had often been chosen for purely military reasons. The material and moral poverty experienced by the inhabitants of such primitive resettlements as those of Tamalous, Oum-Toub, or Bessombourg in the Collo region is well known. 3 Nothing was less concerted and less methodical than these actions. One would try in vain to find an order in the whirlwind of anarchic resettlements brought about by repressive action. 4 The 'resettled' found themselves placed in a situation of absolute subordination to the SAS. 5 Under such pressure from the situation that it had created itself, the army had to concern itself with effectively taking into its charge people whom, until then, it meant only to neutralize and control. It is then that the 'loosening out' and 'degrouping' began. Thus it is quite late, it seems, that resettlement ceases being the consequence pure and simple of evacuation to become the direct object of concerns and even, progressively, the focus of a systematic policy. In spite of the ban declared in the beginning of 1959 on displacing populations without the permission of the civil authorities, the resettlements multiplied: in 1960, the number of resettled Algerians reached 2,157,000, a quarter of the total population. If, besides the resettlements, one takes into account the exodus towards the cities, the number of individuals who found themselves outside of their customary residence in 1960 can be estimated at three million at least, that is, half of the rural population. This population displacement is among the most brutal that history has known. us today and that will permit us perhaps to take possession of its spirit after taking possession of its body.
(Captain Charles Richard, Étude sur l'insurrection du Dahra, 1845-6) I'm from Lorraine, I love straight lines. The people here, they're on bad terms with the straight line.
(Lieutenant from Kerkera, 1960) Of all the economic and social measures decided within the framework of 'pacification', the resettlement of rural populations is without doubt that which is most clearly inscribed in the wake of the great land laws of the 19th century, namely, chiefly the Quartering Act (1856-7), the senatusconsultum of 1863, and the Warnier Act of 1873. What is really striking indeed is that, though separated by an interval of a century, faced with identical situations the functionaries in charge of enforcing the senatusconsultum and the officers responsible for the resettlements resorted to similar measures.
Whether it cynically confessed itself to be a 'war machine' 6 capable of 'disorganizing the tribe' seen as the main obstacle to 'pacification', or whether it claimed to follow an assimilationist ideology more generous in intention, the agrarian policy tending to transform jointly held property into individual goods contributed strongly to disintegrating the traditional social units by shattering an economic equilibrium for which tribal or clan property constituted the best protection, at the same time as it facilitated the concentration of the best land into the hands of the European colonists through the game of permits and indiscriminate sales. The great land laws had the patent function of establishing the conditions favorable to the development of a modern economy founded on private enterprise and individual property, with juridical integration being held as the indispensable precondition for the transformation of the economy. But the latent function of this policy was otherwise. On a first level, it was a question of fostering the dispossession of the Algerians by purveying the colonists with apparently legal means of appropriation, that is, by instituting a juridical system that presupposed an economic attitude and, more precisely, an attitude toward time, that was thoroughly alien to the spirit of the peasant society. On a second level, the disintegration of the traditional units (the tribe, for example) that had been the soul of the resistance against colonization was supposed to result naturally from the destruction of the economic bases of their integration; and this was very much the case, with 1875 marking the end of the great tribal insurrections. 7 transition from barter economy to market economy, the Algerian peasantry found itself effectively swept up in a catastrophic movement. The 1950-1 agricultural census shows that 438,483 farms possessed by Algerians, or 69% of the total, were smaller than 10 hectares and had a combined extent of 1,378,464 hectares, or 18.8% of the total, with the average property area being 3.1 hectares (versus 4.7 in 1940) , which is far below the indispensable minimum for the subsistence of a peasant family. The number of owners of less than 10 hectares grew by about 50,000 between 1940 and 1950, or 12%, while the area covered by their property decreased by 471,000 hectares. But, more profoundly, over the last 30 years the structure of rural society has undergone a decisive transformation: between 1930 and 1954, the number of landowners declined by 20% while the number of farm workers, permanent and seasonal, increased by 29%.
Dispossession of land and proletarianization have also brought about the abandonment of many agrarian traditions. Thus it is, for example, that land shortage and demographic pressure imposing increased production at any cost have led many fellahin to give up the old biennial crop rotation: for the years 1950-1, fallow represented only 62.7% of the amount of sown land. As proof that we have here to do with a forced innovation and not a transformation of economic attitude, biennial crop rotation is more respected the more one moves towards the larger farms. The same goes for the extension of sown fields to the detriment of livestock rearing, an extension determined by the pursuit of the maximum of security. 'Several factors influence cultivation of the land', writes the administrator of the mixed district of Chellala:
There are the irregular rains, the spring frosts, the rocky nature of the terrain. It is painful to report that each year agriculture gains important areas taken away from livestock farming, although the latter is more remunerative. The cultivation of cereals does not pay. Despite the paucity of the expenses involved, it barely allows the fellah to harvest a part of his wheat and his barley for consumption. It keeps him in a state of hypnosis which it is important to rid him of. (SLNA, 1950: 32) Among the fellahin who abandon the fallow year, as among those who plow the pasturelands, it is the same mesmerized, haunting fear that inspires impatient and tense behaviors. Certainly the cultivation of cereals does not pay, but is it only a question of producing for sale on the market? What one wants is to have, for the least price, with the least delay, enough to feed one's family. Thus it is without hesitation that one sacrifices the uncertain future [futur] of production, which is beyond one's grasp, to the imminent and urgent forthcoming [avenir] of consumption (Bourdieu, 1963) .
Because no improvement comes and compensates for the impoverishment of the soil brought about by more intensive farming, and because the pressure of necessity forces one to put mediocre land under cultivation, it is easy to understand how the yields remain very low -4.65 quintals per hectare in 1955. The cultivation of land formerly reserved for fallow and forest only accelerates erosion: between 1940 and 1954, the area cultivated by the Algerians decreased by 321,000 hectares without European property increasing pari passu; given the hunger of the fellahin for land, the chances are few that these areas will be returned to fallow. One can thus consider that they have been destroyed by the erosion that takes away several tens of thousands of hectares every year. 8 That smallholders sow their lands without interruption, almost to the point of exhausting them; that durum wheat and barley, which are indispensable to the making of couscous and the galette, take up 87% of the E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 5 2 land sown by small farmers; that almost all the fellahin devote themselves to cereal cultivation; that the portion left to pasturage, extremely slight on the very small farms, increases in parallel with the total area of the property: all this attests that agricultural activity has and could have no end other than to secure the direct satisfaction of immediate needs, and the intensification in the exploitation of the soil should not be attributed to a concern to increase productivity but to the pressure of necessity. Moreover, if cereals and livestock maintain their association regardless of the property's sizewith the owners of estates larger than 100 hectares cultivating cereals with biennial crop rotation and practicing only extensive livestock farming -, if mixed farming is dominant only on farms of less than one hectare, if farming by the owner decreases in parallel with the size of the farm, and if Algerian agriculture, which has at its disposal three times as much land as European agriculture, employs far fewer wage-workers, both permanent (2.4 times fewer) and seasonal (1.2 times), and resorts to the khamessate, a type of association characteristic of the precapitalist economy and spirit, 9 it is because economic activity remains always oriented towards subsistence rather than productivity, with innovations being more often than not only breaches of the tradition imposed by poverty. More uncertain than ever of the future, the fellah locks himself ever more narrowly in conducts inspired by the search for the greatest security possible: the more the present escapes him the more he holds himself to it, sacrificing every activity that would involve a long-term future to the pursuit of the direct satisfaction of immediate needs. For the poorest of them, the providential foresight that was demanded by tradition is over with. Once the traditional equilibria have been broken, one sees disappear, together with the minimal assurances that made it possible, the effort to shield oneself from the future. Knowing that, whatever he does, he will not manage to bridge the gap, the fellah resigns himself to living one day at a time by resorting to credit, by adding to the revenue of his land the extra income procured by a few days of work at the colonist's. This forced improvidence is the expression of a total mistrust in the future that condemns one to fatalistic surrender.
The traditionalism of despair
This pathological traditionalism is opposed to the foresight of the former rural society, which, through traditional means, assured the maximum foreseeability within the limits drawn by the precariousness of the means of production and the uncertainty of the natural conditions. And, besides, it is almost always associated, especially in the regions of heavy colonization, with the knowledge and recognition of the superiority of the rational farming methods implemented by the colonist. If the fellahin continue to use the swing plow when they know the efficiency of the plow and the tractor, if they produce for family consumption rather than for the market, if they invest as little as possible and content themselves with mediocre products, if they do not use fertilizer and do not modify their cultural ways in anything, this is no longer always in the name of that ancient traditionalism that poverty has already often undermined. If they refuse such longterm improvements as soil rehabilitation berms, it is still not for lack of knowing how to sacrifice a tangible forthcoming to an imaginary future; it is above all because they have not the means to wait for it. Although they willingly recognize, on the abstract and ideal level, the greater efficiency of the techniques employed by the colonist and the greater profitability of market crops, they are compelled to keep to traditional behaviors, because this latter type of farming demands, as they know, big technical and financial means, because they are assured enough of their subsistence to seek after profit, because production intended for the market appears as a risky wager so long as the needs of the group are not totally satisfied. 'The colonists,' says a fellah from the Carnot region, 'can produce for the market because they have secured their own consumption. They can devote themselves to the superfluous because they have the essentials or because they have the certainty that they won't go lacking.' Thus, in place of the traditional traditionalism that suited a strongly integrated society based on a relatively stable economy, there is substituted the traditionalism of despair, inseparable from an economy of survival and a disintegrated society, and appropriate to subproletarians chained to a past that they know to be dead and buried.
Without any other hope than to harvest enough to survive, the most destitute face the choice between this fatalism of the desperate (that has nothing to do with Islam) and forced departure for the city or for France. Rather than being the result of a free decision based on the will to truly set themselves up in urban life, this forced exile is most often only the ineluctable endpoint of a series of renunciations and defeats: a bad harvest and one sells the donkey or the cattle; one borrows at exorbitant rates to bridge the gap or to buy seed; and, at last, having exhausted all recourses, one does not leave -one decamps. 10 Or else, tired of slaving away for such a poor living, one sets off aimlessly, leaving the land to a khammes. 11 In all cases, the departure for the city is a kind of headlong flight determined by poverty. The richest, those who have some savings, hope to set themselves up as shopkeepers in the small neighboring town that they are accustomed to frequent for its markets. Together with traditional handicrafts, commerce is indeed the only type of activity suited to landowners concerned not to derogate, especially when they have stayed in the region where they are known to everyone: 'What is there to do in town?', says a former fellah, an owner of more than 20 hectares who retreated to Carnot:
In town, they find work easily as 'workers of the land' or as laborers, those who were already workmen in the douar. Myself, I can't go work on the farms. . . . The only activity left for me here is commerce, but you have to have the funds.
For their part, the dispossessed smallholders, the former khammes, or the farmhands whom nothing prepares for urban life and who have neither the attitudes nor the aptitudes necessary to adapt themselves, can only hope for the condition of a day laborer, a street hawker, or an unemployed worker while waiting for that 'paradise': a permanent job. 12 War, and particularly the resettlements, have only accelerated the pauperization of the rural masses; those not earning a wage, landowners, khammeses, and sharecroppers, who numbered some 560,000 in 1954, are only 373,000 in 1960, for a drop of 33%; at the same time, the number of wage-earners, seasonal and permanent workers, fell to 421,000, for a decrease of 28%. 13 No doubt part of the difference is due to the fact that many of those who had called themselves farmers or farm workers in 1954 declared themselves unemployed in 1960, whether because they had partially or totally lost their work or because they had adopted a new attitude toward their activity. But, in addition, by completing the destruction of a precarious economic equilibrium, by breaking the temporal and spatial rhythms that were the framework of the whole of social existence, by crumbling the traditional social units, the resettlements accelerated the exodus towards the cities of individuals who had nothing left to lose. Between 1954 and , the overall population of cities and villages rose by 67% in the Algiers region, 63% in the Constantine region, and 48% in the Oran region, with the size of the recorded increase being a function of the existence of cities traditionally endowed with a strong power of attraction, like Algiers, and, above all, of the extent of the resettlement movement in the region considered.
Thus the 'depeasantization', fostered by the simple fact of resettlement, found itself redoubled by the urbanization which, even if temporary, could not but cause irreversible transformations of the economic attitude, at the same time as it accelerated the contagion of needs. 'I have many new needs,' says a refugee from Carnot, 'you have to live as it is the custom to live in town.' The recently settled country folk are acutely conscious of this increase in needs. As a former fellah, resettled in Tlemcen, put it:
A fellah who comes to set himself up in town gets used to the Moorish bath, to cooking with butane. It's impossible for him to return to his douar, where in order to cook you have to go and fetch wood and water from two kilometers away, and in order to take a bath you have to go to the wadi. Myself, I was born and I've lived in poverty, I'm still capable of living like that. Whereas the new generation, the 'atomic' generation, 14 they couldn't live like that any longer. For example, this one here [pointing out a child of 14], if he doesn't have his cutlet and cheese at mealtime, there's trouble.
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Since independence, one has been able to observe the effect of the contagion of needs that has been caused by temporary urbanization: radios, butane, and gas-powered refrigerators have multiplied in the most remote villages (for example, in Aghbala in Little Kabylia and in Aïn-Aghbel in the Kabylia of Collo).
Contact with urban society developed the consciousness of the (everincreasing) disparities that separate the standard of living of cities and that of the rural regions haunted by malnutrition and impoverished of medical resources and school equipment. All the country folk who have sojourned in a city have been able to experience concretely what statistics establish objectively, namely that cities -especially the largest ones -offer higher chances of obtaining wage work, that is, a real job, in opposition to Bourdieu and Sayad ■ Colonial rule and cultural sabir 4 5 7 agriculture which, bringing in no monetary income (or so very little), appears by the same token to be a mere occupation; that cities provide more regular and higher wages (especially the biggest of them, where modern firms are concentrated); and, finally, that they permit a more comfortable life, as urban consumption is much higher than rural consumption, for example 96.45 francs per person per month for the shopkeepers of urban municipalities (even though they are the closest to country folk) versus only 65.97 francs for the shopkeepers of rural villages (Darbel, 1960) . Thus, as much in an indirect way, that is, by accelerating the rural exodus and by fostering the diffusion of urban models, as in a direct way, by tearing the peasants away from their familiar conditions of existence and by causing a decisive break with traditional routines, the resettlements have accelerated the 'depeasantization' already in progress.
Contempt and misunderstandings
War and repression have finished what the colonial policy and the generalization of monetary exchanges had begun. The regions most strongly E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 5 8 affected by this action are those that had been relatively spared until then, since they had remained sheltered from colonization ventures. Indeed, it is in the mountainous regions that the small rural communities, withdrawn into themselves in obstinate faithfulness to their traditions, had been able to safeguard the essential traits of a culture that henceforth will not be able to be spoken of except in the past tense. It is so with the massifs of Kabylia, the Aurès Mountains, the Nemencha Mountains, the Bibane Mountains, the Hodna Mountains, the Tell Atlas above the Mitidja Plain, the Titteri Mountains, and the Ouarsenis Massif, where traditional culture had managed to keep itself relatively unaltered, despite the confiscations that followed upon the insurrections, despite the creation of new administrative units and so many other measures, despite, finally, the transformations determined by simple cultural contagion. 15 In 1960, the mountainous zones where the National Liberation Army had established itself with the greatest speed and strength, as well as the border zones, had been almost completely emptied of their inhabitants, who had been resettled in the piedmont plains or left for the city.
Everything happens as if this war had furnished the occasion for accomplishing to the last the latent intention of colonial policy, a profoundly contradictory intention: to disintegrate or to integrate, to disintegrate in order to integrate or to integrate in order to disintegrate. It is between these opposite poles that colonial policy always balanced, without the choice being made clearly and systematically applied, so that contradictory intentions could animate different officials at the same moment or the same official at different moments. The will to destroy the structures of Algerian society could indeed be inspired by opposing ideologies: the one, dominated by the exclusive consideration of the colonist's interest and by concerns of strategy, tactics, or proselytism, often expressed itself cynically; the other, an assimilationist or integrationist ideology, is more generous only in appearance.
For certain officials, moved by one dominant preoccupation, 'to conquer the populations', the role of the army is defined by the 'triptych: protect, engage, control'. 'Now to protect,' writes Alain Jacob, is first of all to resettle. In each resettlement a 'military cell' on the order of one soldier for every thirty to fifty persons provides close protection, takes the census of the inhabitants, sets up records, and conducts frequent interrogations. The engagement depends on the 'structuring' of the population, which presupposes the deployment of officials trained in special centers. . . . Finally, only a total and permanent control permits these methods to bear fruit. (1961: 33-4) Certain 'theorists' of psychological action have gone still further, seeing in systematic and provoked destructuring the means of breaking down resistances.
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Opposed to this ideology dominated by strategic and tactical considerations is the humanitarian ideology embodied in the SAS officer of official imagery, at once builder, schoolmaster, mayor, and sometimes medical doctor: by setting up in villages provided with community facilities and situated near the great communication axes of the populations who until then lived nearby in scattered settlements or in remote regions that were therefore very difficult and costly to treat, school, and administer, the intention was to spark off an 'accelerated evolution'. In short, the resettlements, originally considered a means of 'taking back hold' of and 'controlling' the populations by placing them in the vicinity of a military post, came gradually to be construed by some as a 'factor of emancipation', the confusion between the two ends being authorized and encouraged by the conviction that, in order to break down the resistances of this society, there was no better technique than to break down its structures. 16 In actuality, whatever the intention of the individuals was, 'humanitarian' action remained objectively a weapon of war, aimed at control of the populations.
It is not by happenstance if colonialism found its ultimate ideological refuge in the integrationist discourse: indeed, segregationist conservatism and assimilationism are opposed only in appearance. In the one case, one invokes de facto differences in order to deny the identity of rights, and in the other case, one denies de facto differences in the name of the identity of rights. Or else one grants the dignity of man, but only to the virtual Frenchman; or else one sees to it that this dignity be denied by invoking the originality of North African civilization -but an entirely negative originality, defined by default.
Prisoners of the interests of colonization or of what Ruth Benedict (1934) calls 'the massive universality of Western civilization', politicians and administrative or military officials can conceive of no greater generosity than to grant the Algerians the right to be what they ought to be, thus to be in the image of the European, which amounts to denying what they are in fact, in their originality as a particular people, participating in a singular culture. This being the case, one can, in the name of the same rationalizations, leave them to what they are, abandon them in order to subordinate them, or grant them the dignity of being on condition that they cease to be what they are.
The common root of assimilationism and colonialism, the refusal (conscious or unconscious) to recognize Algeria as an original culture and as a nation, has always served as the foundation for a policy of indiscriminate and inconsistent interventionism, ignorant of its strength and its weakness, capable of destroying the precolonial order without being able to institute a better order in its place. This policy which, fusing cynicism and unconsciousness, has determined the ruin of the rural economy and the E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 6 0 collapse of the traditional society finds its crowning in the population resettlements.
Although the most extensive initiative was in most cases left to subordinate authorities, the resettlement villages all resemble one another in the main, since they were born less of obedience to an explicit or implicit doctrine than of the application of unconscious models -those that, a century earlier, governed the establishment of colonial villages. Algeria has been the experiment-ground onto which the military mind has overlayed its structures as in a projective test. Often invested with an absolute de facto authority, the army cadres decided everything: the location of the village, its ground-plan, the width of the streets, the interior layout of the houses. Not knowing or not wanting to know about the traditional norms and models, little inclined to consult the populations concerned, placed in a situation such that, if they had sought it, this participation would have been tacitly refused them, they imposed their order, most often without perceiving the malaise and disarray to which their initiatives gave rise.
In the manner of the Roman colonist, the officers charged with organizing the new collectivities began by disciplining space as if, through it, they hoped to discipline people. Everything was put under the sign of the uniform and the alignment: constructed according to imposed norms and on imposed locations, the houses were laid out, straight as an arrow, along wide streets that draw up the plan of a Roman castrum or of a colonial village. In the center, the square with the triad characteristic of French villages: the school, the town hall, and the monument to the dead. And one may think that, were it not for lacking the time and means, the SAS officers, in love with geometry, would have also submitted the countryside to centuriation.
By a deliberate or unconscious ignorance of social realities, the local authorities most often imposed upon the 'resettled' an absolutely foreign order, an order for which they were not cut out and which was not cut out for them. Animated by the feeling of accomplishing a great design, namely 'making the masses evolve', exalted by the passion for ordering and creating, sometimes engaging all their enthusiasm and all their resources in their action, the officers applied without a shade of difference unconscious schemata of organization that could belong to the essence of any enterprise of total and systematic domination. Everything happened as if the colonist instinctively hit upon the anthropological law stating that the reorganization of the settlement pattern [habitat], a symbolic projection of the culture's most fundamental structures, entails a generalized transformation of the cultural system. Lévi-Strauss remarks that the missionaries saw in the transformation of the settlement pattern imposed upon the Bororo the surest means of obtaining their conversion (Lévi-Strauss, 1955: 229; see also Bastide, 1960: 114-15) . The reorganization of inhabited space was thus obscurely grasped as a decisive manner of making a blank slate of the past by imposing a new framework of existence at the same time as imprinting on the soil the mark of the taking of possession. 17 If the resettlement policy has garnered among military men so general and so enthusiastic an adherence, it is because it realized a dream as old as colonization, namely 'modifying' -as general Bugeaud said a century ago-or 'restructuring' -as the colonels said in the 1950s -an entire society. Mostefa Lacheraf cites Captain Richard, who, as early as 1845, was advocating the massive resettlement of the Algerian populations:
The first thing, to take away the control levers of the agitators, is to agglomerate the scattered members of the people, to organize all the tribes subject to us into zemalas. 18 . . . The various douars would be separated one from another by a hedgerow of wild jujube trees or of any other bushes. Finally, the whole zemala would be surrounded by a large ditch armed with cactus. 19 The constancies and recurrences of colonial policy have nothing in them that should surprise us: a situation that has remained identical secretes the same methods, aside from some superficial differences, at an interval of a century. The resettlement policy, a pathological response to the mortal crisis of the colonial system, makes the pathological intention that inhabited the colonial system shine forth bright as day.
Cultural sabir
To those who, wishing to stand apart, ostentatiously adopted certain Western models, the elders, as the guardians of tradition, reserved this remark: 'He wants to walk with the steps of the partridge, [but] he has forgotten the steps of the hen.' Nowadays, it is an entire people, uncertain how to move on, who is stumbling and faltering. The very logic of the colonial situation has produced a new type of men and women, who may be defined negatively, by what they no longer are and by what they are not yet, 'dispeasanted' peasants (paysans dépaysannés), self-destructive beings who carry within themselves all the contraries.
The break with the peasant condition and the betrayal of the peasant spirit are the culmination of a purely negative process leading to the abandonment of the land and the flight to the city or to a resigned permanence in a devalued and devaluing condition rather than to the invention of a new type of relationship with the land and work on the land. The 'empeasanted' peasants (paysans empaysannés) are gone for ever, but modern agriculturalists are still far and few. In every village there are still a few 'naïve' peasants stubbornly perpetuating an outmoded art of living, and one finds a few agriculturalists capable of managing their farms according Bourdieu and 
to the rules of economic rationality. Yet the opposition between the traditionalist peasant and the modern peasant no longer has any more than a heuristic value and only defines the extreme poles of a continuum of behaviors and attitudes separated by an infinity of infinitesimal differences.
The coexistence of contraries
Is not such an object a challenge to scientific analysis and is one not condemned merely to juxtapose descriptions as contradictory as the object depicted? It is tempting indeed -and many have done just that -to select, on the basis of tacit or proclaimed interests and values, one aspect or another of a contradictory reality to conclude either that the Algerian peasant is irretrievably doomed to archaism, or that he is the bearer of revolutionary expectations and ideals. On one farm run by self-management [autogestion], the efforts to increase productivity are compromised by the play of the old traditions of solidarity, which lead the workers to attract their non-working relatives there and which greatly increase the disproportion between production and the workforce employed. 20 On another, there is a great temptation among the peasants recently installed there to resolve the contradiction in the same manner as the permanent farm laborers on the colonial estates used to, that is, by withdrawing from rational exploitation a few plots of land that would serve as supports for islands of traditionalism, where exploitation and possession coincide. But the same laborers may also, in the name of the opposite logic, protest against the equalization of wages that abolishes all correspondence between the quality or quantity of labor supplied and the product of that labor; in some cases they may even act in accordance with the strict logic of rational calculation and reduce their effort in proportion to the reduction of income. 21 It is clear that, more than any other, this multi-faceted reality holds out traps for hurried or prejudiced minds. In all realms of existence, at all levels of experience, one finds the same successive or simultaneous contradictions, the same ambiguities. The patterns of behavior and the economic ethos imported by colonization coexist inside of each subject with the patterns and ethos inherited from ancestral tradition. It follows that behaviors, attitudes, or opinions appear as fragments of an unknown language, as incomprehensible to someone who does not know the cultural language of the tradition as to someone who refers only to the cultural language of colonization. Sometimes it is the words of the traditional language that are combined according to the modern syntax, sometimes the opposite, and sometimes it is the syntax itself that appears as the product of a combination.
An example: the traditional society regarded work as a social function, a duty incumbent upon every man concerned with his honor, in his own E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 6 4 eyes as in the eyes of the group, and this quite apart from any consideration of profitability and yield; according to the capitalist economy, work has the primary function of procuring a monetary income and therefore obeys the logic of productivity and profitability. Among the subproletarians of the cities and the proletarianized peasants in the countryside, activity becomes a mere matter of being 'occupied', a way of doing something rather than nothing, for a minuscule or nil profit: it cannot, therefore, be completely elucidated either in the logic of interest and profit, or in the logic of honor. Like the ambiguous forms of Gestalttheorie, it can be the object of two quite different readings, depending on the framework of reference used to interpret it. 22 But the ambiguity is not in the apprehension of the object, it lies within the object itself: like the subproletarian, when the spuriously occupied peasant experiences, thinks, or judges his condition, he constantly refers to two different and even opposing logics. It follows that each of the one-sided descriptions of the reality suffices to account for the whole reality, except for that which constitutes its essence, namely, contradiction. So much to say that, to achieve an adequate grasp of an objectively contradictory reality, one must resort simultaneously to two contradictory frameworks: faithfulness to the contradictory reality forbids one to choose between the contradictory aspects that make up the real.
The farm laborers who lived directly on the estates of the colonists found in this double-sidedness a way of escaping the contradiction that ineluctably flowed from their participation in two mutually alien universes. The same who, as tractor drivers, vine pruners or market gardeners, worked the land of the colonist using the most rationalized working methods and the most modern techniques reverted to the most traditional agrarian practices to cultivate the patches that the colonist conceded to them on the confines of the estate: ploughing was very often done using yokes formed by recourse to the traditional contract of association (charka); many tasks brought together the whole group in accordance with the customary rules of mutual assistance (twiza), and most activities occupied the whole familial workforce, including women and children; the products of cultivation, intended for household consumption, consisted almost exclusively of cereals, grown without manure or fertilizer so that the yields, at 400 or 500 kilos per hectare, were as low as those from mountain farming. 23 Finally, no one thought of bringing into his activity as a fellah the concerns of the agricultural laborer and, for example, of worrying about the relationship between the quantity or quality of the effort put in and the product of this labor. It was no different with those who, having remained fellahin, hired themselves out periodically on the colonial estates. This double-sidedness expressed itself in all realms of existence, whether it be religious life, leisure activities, or matrimonial exchanges: an island of pathological -that is to say, excessive and decontextualized -traditionalism found itself transported into the very heart of the realm of highly mechanized and rationalized capitalist agriculture. 24 The dualism assumed even more subtle forms among the beneficiaries of the CAPER or the members of the SCAPCOs. 25 Settled on fertile land and provided with the most modern means of cultivation, they were invited by the whole situation to adopt the ultimate ends inscribed in it and, for example, to pursue profitability and productivity. But this was not enough to move them to a total renunciation of traditional ends and values. Too unsure of themselves and their situation to be able to choose, they acted as if they wanted to cumulate the advantages of the two systems, so that they were seen pursuing traditional ends by modern means or, conversely, pursuing modern ends by traditional means; or, still more paradoxically, pursuing ends that were mutually incompatible because they pertained to the two opposing logics. If the dispeasanted peasant can no longer live his condition except in contradiction, this is because he would want to have both the set of material and moral securities that the traditionalist society, oriented towards satisfying immediate needs at the least cost and with the least risk, ensured for itself at the cost of renouncing the pursuit of maximum profit, and the advantages that the modern economy acquires only at the cost of greater and generally riskier investments.
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One understands why the Algerian peasant finds in this double reference reasons for discontent which, although mutually exclusive, reinforce and compound each other. One also understands why he desperately persists in making the impossible choice of not choosing between the two logics: for example, among the members of the SCAPCOs, the former peasants would like to use the means normally used in production for the market (tractors, fertilizers, etc.) to produce goods intended for their own consumption, such as wheat and barley; others aspire to use modern means to cultivate their small, poor plots in accordance with the traditional logic, that is, without any concern for profitability and productivity. More generally, the former peasants wish to preserve the charms of farqa life (festivities, social relations, etc.), which they evoke with nostalgia, while enjoying the advantages provided by the rationalized rigor of labor according to the capitalist logic. And the inconsistencies are perhaps what enables them to bear (if not Bourdieu and Sayad ■ Colonial rule and cultural sabir 4 6 7 overcome) the contradiction of which they are the product. Can the dispeasanted peasant in fact perpetuate himself as such except in and through contradiction? 'If the peasant counted,' says a Kabyle proverb, 'he would not sow.' A man who has made the calculation and yet continues to sow commits an absurdity, whereas his ancestors, who sowed without counting, purely and simply escaped the grip of economic logic. Better yet, if he were to strive to modernize the techniques used and to rationalize the modes of production, the peasant would only compound the fundamental absurdity of his situation, since it is the very fact of continuing to cultivate unprofitable land that offends the logic of the rational economy. 26 The empeasanted peasant was adapted to a land from which he expected, as if through grace, only the means of living or surviving; the dispeasanted peasant, by contrast, is doomed to contradiction because he is pursuing the impossible and, knowing this, he has no choice but the feigned and fictitious perpetuation of the traditional routines or the innovation that compounds (but does not overcome) the contradiction to which the spirit of calculation has given rise. 27 This is what the economists forget when they denounce the breaches of economic rationality that the peasants commit -and not only in Algeria. Is it not from these very lapses from economic logic that the peasants also draw their incentive to pursue their undertaking, however unprofitable it may be? It is, for example, the same point of honor that forbids abandoning the ancestral property and that leads to prestige-oriented behaviors that can ruin it, as the temptation to behave conspicuously sometimes increases as the crisis of agriculture deepens.
The dispeasanted peasant cannot revive traditional agriculture; he can only, by lying to himself, perpetuate the appearance of it. And this is as true of the peasants of Aghbala or Djemaâ-Saharidj as of the beneficiaries of the CAPER or the SCAPCOs or the laborers on the self-managed farms. Because they remain closer to the traditional peasant than to the rational farmer, both of them tend to revert to peasantness or the appearances of peasantness, rather than invent the new system of models that adaptation to modern agriculture demands. Nor can the peasants in the regions saved from the direct shock of colonization be unaware of the illusory character of farming the light soils of the uplands; but equally they cannot continue to cultivate the heavier soils with the traditional means appropriate to a buqâa (small plot) or an ah'riq (field). The contradiction is in the situation itself, either because the soil cannot produce enough to justify using rational techniques, or because they do not have the means to draw from the soil what it could produce.
But, more profoundly, the contradiction is in the peasants themselves. If the Algerian peasant does not manage to choose between the two systems and if he wants to have the advantages of each at the same time, this is E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 6 8 because he cannot apprehend them as such: of the modern economic system, always perceived from the outside in its most external manifestations, he has a necessarily truncated vision such that he can only grasp decontextualized scraps of it (cf. Bourdieu et al., 1963: 370-1) ; of the traditional system, he has retained only scattered fragments and only resistance and fears, rather than a living spirit. In short, for lack of speaking the two cultural languages well enough to keep them clearly separated, he is condemned to the interferences and incoherences that make a cultural sabir.
Djeha's nail 28
The system of necessary contradictions that the Algerian fellah bears within himself is most clearly manifested when the conditions of its constitution disappear. So long as the colonial system persisted, the dispeasanted peasant Bourdieu and Sayad ■ Colonial rule and cultural sabir 4 6 9 was doomed to not choose between the two logics because he could not apprehend them as such and because, had he done so, he did not have the means to carry through the choice of rationalization to its ultimate consequences. The effort to master the future can be effectively undertaken only when the indispensable conditions are fulfilled for it to be assured of a minimum chance of success. So long as this is not case, there is no other possible attitude than enforced traditionalism, which is essentially different from traditional traditionalism in that it implies the awareness of the possibility of acting otherwise and of the impossibility of realizing that possibility.
With the abolition of the colonial system, the objective causes of the contradictions of conduct have disappeared, at least partially, as the peasants have retaken possession of the greater part of the land held by the colonists -but not all the contradictions have disappeared for that. The incoherences that marked the behavior and aspirations of the peasants of the CAPER or the SCAPCOs were manifestly (perhaps too manifestly) related to the contradiction contained within those institutions, which were fictitious negations of the colonial system that they served and that made them possible. So the observer and the peasants themselves could reasonably expect the pathological behaviors to disappear with the pathogenic cause. If the contradictions that now threaten the efforts to socialize agriculture are disconcerting, this is because the whole historical context (even at the highest levels of Algerian policy-making) favors the illusory hope that, through a kind of sudden mutation, the decisive change in the conditions of existence (and, more precisely, concerning agriculture, in the modes and relations of production) will automatically lead to a decisive transformation of the behaviors and ideologies that they favored. 29 The seduction of this naïve representation of social reality and of the logic of its transformation is particularly strong for a society which, achieving its decolonization at the end of a long and terrible war, seeks to signal, by all possible means, including magical ones, a critical break with a past defeated and discarded, and more precisely for the intellectual petty-bourgeoisie, which holds most of the positions of authority and which for the most part has an image of the peasants stripped of what makes their historical character.
The colonial system lives on so long as the contradictions that it left behind it are not truly surmounted, which presupposes that they be grasped and confronted as such. Now, the logic of decolonization (a negation that bears the mark of what it negates) inclines the petty bourgeoisie of bureaucrats to magically deny the contradictions of reality as shameful ghosts of a dead colonialism rather than strive to overcome them through action guided by an adequate knowledge of the real. But the idealist and idealized image of the peasant cannot long withstand the test of reality, and belief in the revolutionary spontaneity of the rural masses is liable to give way to a E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 7 0 more pessimistic but no more realistic conception. Are we not already seeing the 'libertarian socialism' (according to Guérin, 1963) of the self-managed sector, threatened by tensions between popular demands and bureaucratic interventions, being opposed by an authoritarian socialism that has the backing of the army?
In all cases, the real peasant is replaced by an abstraction. Indeed, the arbitrary selection of aspects that only exist as elements of a contradictory reality presupposes that the peasant be disassociated from the conditions of existence that have made him what he is: one has to ignore everything of the condition of the agricultural laborers and the dispeasanted peasantshaunted by the uncertainty of what tomorrow will bring, prevented from finding in a world that crushes them a beginning of the realization of their hopes, and having no other freedom than that of expressing their revolt through cheating on effort and daily guile that gradually gnaw at one's dignity 30 -to give any credence to the eschatological prophecies that see the peasantry of colonized countries as the only truly revolutionary class. 31 Or would one suppose, through a new abstraction, that the effects of economic exploitation and cultural dispossession disappear at the same time as their cause? In fact, we know that the different levels of social reality do not necessarily transform themselves at the same rate and that manners of Bourdieu and 
behaving and thinking outlive a change in the conditions of existence. The peasant can be liberated from the colonist without being liberated from the contradictions that colonization has nurtured in him.
Contradictory abstractions
Colonization has taken more than his land from the Algerian peasant; it has stripped him of a good that cannot be magically restored or assigned to him and that he must not only remake but make: his culture. Having regained possession of land which, because it has been profoundly transformed, presents itself to him as a system of objective demands, the fellah finds himself confronted with the task of creating the system of patterns of behavior and thought that will enable him to adapt to this new situation. So long as he has not regained possession of himself by elaborating a new coherent culture, the Algerian peasant can tread the soil of the colonist, cultivate it or harvest its fruits, without really taking possession of it. Like those families who, having suddenly moved from the shanty-town (bidonville) to an apartment with modern facilities, fail to take possession of the space allotted to them and who 'bidonvillize' their living-space because they cannot modernize their way of life, for lack of the necessary resources and of being capable of adopting the system of conducts and attitudes demanded by modern accommodation, 32 the dispeasanted peasants are in danger of regressing to more rudimentary but more reassuring systems of adaptation, either by reintroducing the most traditional agrarian techniques and customs or because they tend to behave like simple laborers expecting nothing more from their labor than a wage. The advocates of authoritarian socialism and the advocates of libertarian socialism can find in a two-sided reality arguments favorable to the abstract (because partial) representation of the real that they make for themselves. The champions of 'democracy from below' (according to the official phrase) can, rightly, invoke the aspiration of the peasants to take possession of the lands of the colonist and manage them as masters. But does not the very organization of the management committees (set up by the emerging Algerian state) run counter to this expectation? Indeed, the peasants show great impatience with the multiple and often clumsy interference of the countless tutors who surround them with cumbersome solicitude -prefectures and sub-prefectures, local party organizations, the UGTA (General Union of Algerian Workers), 'directors' or 'managing officials', the SAP, 33 etc. In many cases, for the former agricultural laborers, the relationship with the bureaucrat delegated by the central authority, who is perceived as a 'stranger', a city-dweller or an intruder, is the occasion to reproduce the relationship they had with the colonist, or rather with the agronomists of the CAPER or the SCAPCOs.
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The fact is that, in the eyes of the peasant, possession of the land remains abstract and fictitious if it does not translate into the 'mastery of the land', that is to say, the sovereign freedom to organize all the moments of agricultural activity, from production to marketing. 34 Limitations of power and interferences undermine the sense of ownership and lead the peasant, uncertain of his relationship to the land he cultivates, to behave as he did in the past, as a simple wage-earner; or, even if all guarantees are given to him, he has the sense of being robbed, not so much as regards his income and profits as in his rights as owner. 35 In short, libertarian socialism risks bringing about ends opposite to those it explicitly pursues and re-establishing the peasants in the condition of laborers as uncommitted as possible to a labor whose organization they leave to others and from which they expect no more than a regular wage.
The decision that sets wages uniformly at 7 francs a day, whatever the quantity and quality of the labor provided, can only work in the same direction. Indeed, the peasants are sufficiently versed in economic calculation to measure spontaneously the quantity of labor provided (according to its quality) against the remuneration received. We know that in many places laborers formerly paid by task have reduced their output in proportion to the reduction in their wages; we also know that the levelling of wages regardless of skills elicits resistance. And is it sufficient, to interest the members of the management committees in the collective enterprise, to present the daily wage as an advance on the profits? In fact this amounts to asking the peasant to adopt an attitude toward agricultural activity that is unfamiliar to him as it could be, and his scepticism, far from expressing merely his distrust of the state, embodied by the director, is constitutive of his attitude toward the future. Moreover, without a long preliminary education, how could he be expected to understand and handle notions so complex and so profoundly alien to his cultural tradition as those of cooperation and collective profit, 36 to distinguish between operating costs, investments for the collective concern, and investments of general interest, or even, more simply, between the revenue from the sale of the crops and the net profit?
Confronted with the test of reality, this system, inspired by a populist ideology, is turning into its opposite, an authoritarian-type organization. Self-management is gradually -and very logically -being replaced by what the Roman jurists called negotiorum gestio: the tutor, i.e., the state, in the person of the director, the managing official or the SAP, acts in the place of the ward, who has not yet attained the age of majority, and his power knows no limit except the obligation to give account. And one may wonder whether the 'peasant distrust' that observers so readily invoke is anything other than the response to an unavowed distrust of the real peasant, a distrust dissimulated behind the appearances of generosity towards and respect for the fictitious and, one might say, ideal peasant.
The advocates of authoritarian socialism can find their best arguments in the evidence of the contradictions which self-management brings to light: if one explicitly and deliberately treats workers as mere wage-earners, totally excluded from management and from sharing in the profits, one at least spares oneself the ambiguities or duplicities of 'oriented' elections or the conflicts and tensions between the elected representatives of the workers and the bureaucrats; by the same token, one gains in output and efficiency, as experience has shown in many cases. Moreover, just as one can argue in defence of self-management that it aims to satisfy the very strong aspiration of the peasants to cultivate the property taken back from the colonist as masters of the land, so the advocates of authoritarian socialism can point to the fact that the dispeasanted peasants aspire to the security given to them by a regular wage and the condition of 'laborer-peasants'.
This type of organization no doubt has the merit of presenting itself for what it is; but does it not tend purely and simply to replace the colonist E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 7 4 with a state bureaucracy? What lasting benefit will the former farm laborers have gained from independence, aside from persuading themselves that they accept their low wages by a free sacrifice in the name of the revolution? Should one be surprised that they remain deaf to the exaltation of 'socialist consciousness'? Or that, behaving as simple wage-earners motivated by the sole pursuit of maximum profit, they calibrate their effort to the monetary income they derive from it and that, in their masked struggle against the employer-state, they resort to the traditional weapons of the subproletarian -guile and even fraud? 37 It would be an exaggeration to say that the educated petty bourgeoisie uses revolutionary language cynically as an instrument of exploitation; but there is no doubt that the authoritarian, i.e., centralized and bureaucratic socialism towards which the various Algerian experiments are tending, whether by explicit choice or under the pressure of events, can only serve the interests of that part of the petty bourgeoisie with an interest in bureaucratization, by giving a technical and ideological justification to its authority and privileges and by shielding it from the impatient and often incoherent demands of the sub-proletarians of the countryside and the cities.
But, in addition, when one knows that in 1960 the average monthly income of farmers was 160 francs and that of farm laborers 132 francs (for the whole of Algeria), and, more precisely, that 87.1% of the agriculturalists and 89.4% of the agricultural laborers had a monthly income of less than 200 francs, it is clear that, with their 7 francs a day (210 francs a month), together with bonuses and a possible share in profits, the fellahin of the self-managed estates inevitably appear as privileged in the eyes of the casual workers, the khammes, the underemployed smallholders, and the mass of partially or fictitiously occupied individuals. A great disappointment is already felt by all those who have not gained what they expected from independence, that is, the land; and there can only be growing tension between the 'privileged' workers of the self-managed estates and the seasonal workers, who are excluded from a number of economic and political advantages (for example, the election of delegates). Thus, although the political and economic stakes of the experiments in self-management are of immense importance, since the future of modern agriculture and the possibility of inventing a just and at the same time efficient organization of the relations of production depend upon them, the self-managed sector must not and cannot be considered as a world unto itself. If too great a disparity is allowed to develop between a wealthy agricultural sector, providing regular and relatively high incomes to a minority of full-time workers, and the great mass of the rural population, this will only perpetuate, in another form, the contradiction that ran through colonial society and accelerate the devolution of the peasant lifestyle (dépaysannisation) by making the duality of two types of agriculture appear as inscribed in the nature of things and by finally convincing the fellahin located on the margins of the richer lands that they are irretrievably doomed to a subsistence economy and to the traditionalism of despair.
The educator and the bureaucrat
But, in the final analysis, to what extent are the ends of a rational policy compatible with the contradictory ends that the Algerian peasant bears within him in the virtual state? For both political and economic reasons, a rational action must reconcile ends and means that may come into contradiction without being intrinsically incompatible: in the first place, the intervention of the central authority seems indispensable and, in any case inevitable, whether it is accomplished through the agency of a bureaucracy, a union, a party, or a body of technicians. This is so, first, because, left to themselves, the peasants settled on the large estates abandoned by the colonists, and a fortiori the others, are liable to cling to the most traditional mode of production, for lack of the technical and financial means that they know are the necessary condition for modernization and rationalization, and also because their whole attitude towards the world (linked to their conditions of existence through the mediation of the consciousness they have of them) and their whole cultural tradition inclines them to choose to maximize security, be it at the expense of profit, rather than to maximize profit at the expense of security. Did we not see, for example, in the Soummam valley, peasants who had spontaneously formed themselves into a management committee dividing a former colonial estate into plots barely capable of supporting a family and growing there wheat, barley and beans, using the most traditional techniques, until the central authority intervened? 38 The intervention, however, cannot be limited to the economic sphere, inasmuch as economic choices are also, and before all else, cultural choices. Locked in contradiction, the peasant cannot, by essence, have an adequate representation of his condition, and still less of the contradictions of that representation. And so it behooves a revolutionary elite to define with him (and not for him) what he has to be, in and through an action guided by a theory both systematic and realistic, in other words, a theory that takes into account all the aspects, including the contradictory aspects, of what he really is.
But are not the means required to achieve the economic and cultural ends, namely, external intervention, liable to enter into contradiction with the very ends that they are supposed to serve? If it is true, as we have seen, that the peasant identifies 'mastery of the land', the condition for his commitment, with the freedom to do his work as he sees fit, then it goes without saying that an intervention aiming to organize and stimulate E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 7 6 his teaching (that is, actions aimed to incite and to organize), and his preliminary training must primordially provide him with the means to perform this continuous creation. The specificity of educative action, in its ideal form, is precisely that it adapts to the aptitudes and expectations of those whom it seeks to elevate and transform, and whom it therefore knows and respects; that it defines, in each case, a system of demands adjusted to those aptitudes and expectations and so to their transformation under the influence of the educative action; in short, that it refuses to arbitrarily put forward demands that are abstractly defined for abstract subjects. Thus the centralizing action of a rigid bureaucracy would be replaced by a particularized action, directly adapted to particular situations and particular persons. It is in the permanent confrontation between the expectations of the peasants and the demands of the elites, who are responsible for setting and gradually achieving rational ends, that an authentic culture, a system of models of social and economic behavior at once coherent and compatible with the objective conditions, can be elaborated. If the revolutionary elites want to succeed in this task, it is clear that it is of themselves that they must require the exceptional virtues that they now expect of the peasants and, all too often, of them alone. État (1961: 204-34) . 4 Thus the report of the office of rural development of the prefecture of Orléansville, published in 1961, indicates that 185,000 'resettled' of the département, 60% of the total, should be moved back into their homes, given such a low standard of living and such unsanitary conditions. 5 The Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) were army units designed to implement a 'policy of integration' of the native Algerian population. Created in 1955 in response to the independentist insurrection, they blanketed the Algerian territory in pursuit of a civil mission (of economic, social, and medical assistance) wedded to military tasks of intelligence gathering, order maintenance, and close-up population control. For key data and documents, see Mathias (1998) [translator]. 6 Captain Vaissière wrote in 1863: 'The senatusconsultum of 1863 is in effect the most efficient war machine that can be imagined against the indigenous social state, and the most powerful and prolific instrument that could be put into the hands of our colonists' (Vaissière, 1863: 90) . 7 One of the promoters of the senatusconsultum, A. de Broglie (1860), declared that this measure had a double design: in the first place, 'to bring about a general liquidation of the land', with a part of the land remaining in the hands of its former owners not as the collective inheritance of the tribe but as 'personal, definite, and divided property', and the other part intended 'to attract and receive emigration from Europe', and secondly, 'to disorganize the tribe', 'the main obstacle' to 'pacification'. One could give many examples of declarations in the same mould (see Lacheraf, 1960: esp. 749-56) . 8 One will find a rough picture of the transformations of the rural economy between 1939 and 1954 in Nouschi (1962: chapter 5) , and an illuminating analysis of the agricultural census of 1950 -1951 in Isnard (1960 . 9 'It is 64% of farms of 100 hectares or larger, and 62.8% of their land area, which are more or less under the khamessate' (Isnard, 1960: 58) . A khammes is a sharecropper who receives a one-fifth share. 10 Bourdieu and Sayad use a word (déguerpit) that is both a current colloquialism for 'decamp, scram' and an old legal term meaning 'to abandon ownership and possession of (a piece of land), in order to shirk the attendant obligations' [translator] . 11 The 1950 agricultural census shows that many very small properties belong to non-farming owners who entrust their land to khammeses. 12 This point is further elaborated in Bourdieu (1962 Bourdieu ( , 1973 and Bourdieu et al. (1963: 303-10) [translator]. 13 Cf. Bourdieu et al. (1963: Part 1, p. 83) . It shall be seen that the resettlements also accelerated the formation within the rural world of an affluent class made up of peasants who were able to farm the land abandoned by the others because they had held on to means of production (livestock), of shopkeepers, and also of functionaries or employees appointed by the army. Some families from the centers studied combined these three types of advantages. 14 This is a reference to the successful explosion by France of its first atomic bomb in February 1960 at the Reggane military camp in the Algerian Sahara desert [translator] . 15 For example, 48 kilometers west of Orléansville, in the mountains that overlook the lower Chélif river valley, a heavily colonized area, the OuledZiad tribe has perpetuated all the characteristics of a strongly integrated traditional society, thanks to the isolation safeguarded by its topography. 16 In a memorandum by General Crépin, dated 7 April 1960, one reads: 'Thus military concerns join together with considerations of a political or humanitarian order in favor of imposing some viable resettlements' (cited by Jacob, 1961: 35) . The confusion of contradictory objectives was fostered by the overall cast of the situation: the resettlement policy was proposed as a positive task, both 'humanitarian' and efficient, in opposition to the disappointing enterprise of pacification. It allowed for the justification of a Manichaean view of the revolutionary war, with the army's constructive action responding to the 'destructions' of the 'rebels'. It gave to many the feeling of reconciling morality and politics. 17 Such was the quasi-explicit intention of the Roman centuriation, 'a veritable system of coordinates plotted on the ground': 'In the beginning of colonization, at least, Rome made a blank slate of the past by imposing a E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 8 0 24 Through this dualism, the laborers could, in a quasi-magical way, avoid the wrenches that would have resulted from any effort to unify a double and contradictory experience. As for the colonist employer, he obviously benefited from this: so long as this reserve of labor power remained a cultural 'reservation,' it could not pose the problems that would inevitably have arisen from a working population animated by a spirit of labor demands. Moreover, the colonist could point to the 'benefits in kind' that he granted his laborers as pretext for remitting very low wages (roughly 30% below the official minimum wage for Algeria) and for flouting the restrictions on the length of working time. Finally, these allotments provided an excellent means of exploiting the laborers, either by binding them through the appearance of generosity or by holding them under the threat of depriving them of the land enabling them to indulge in the illusion of still being independent peasants. 25 The CAPER (the acronym for Caisse pour l'Accession à la Propriété et à l'Exploitation Rurale, the 'Fund for accession to ownership and exploitation in rural areas'), was set up by a decree of the French authorities on 26 March 1955. From 1958, its main purpose was to finance the agrarian reform envisaged by the Constantine Plan 'for the modernization and integration of Algeria,' including the purchase, improvement, division and allocation of 250,000 hectares of land to 15,000 fellahin. The SCAPCOs (for Sections Coopératives Agricoles du Plan de Constantine) were agricultural cooperatives set up under the Constantine Plan [translator] . 26 If, among the farmers of the CAPER of Aïn-Sultan and Lavarande and the SCAPCO of Marabout Blanc, the former fellahin are less discontented than the former agricultural laborers of those same estates, this is because the former can find in the relative increase in their incomes a compensation for abandoning reassuring routines, whereas the latter have lost the security they derived from a regular wage and the perpetuation of the traditionalist way of life, without having for that the means of achieving for themselves the modernization and total rationalization of the agricultural undertaking they have experienced. 27 Questioned about the use of fertilizer, a fellah from Matmata replied, with a half-ironic, half-resigned smile: 'With a hand-plough, use fertilizer? That's too far-fetched!' 28 When selling a house, Djeha (a stock character in legends) asked that a nail in it be reserved for him. Every day he would come hang carcasses from it, whereby he quickly got rid of the buyers. 29 One of the senior officials responsible for economic policy-making in Algeria to whom we pointed out, in March 1963, the usefulness, for the organizers of the management committees, of the lessons provided by the study of the experiments in agricultural cooperation (the CAPER and SCAPCOs) undertaken in the days of colonization, indignantly rejected this comparison.
E t h n o g r a p h y 5(4) 4 8 2 different buyers, without, above all, having firmly set the price of a quintal of figs, and without being assured of immediately receiving the money due from the sale? Not surprisingly, very few peasants sold their crop to the cooperative, all the others preferring to sell to clandestine buyers who paid 80 francs a quintal. 37 This is obviously true for all the management committees where, due to the interference of the bureaucracy, the participation of the workers remains feeble. 38 The traditionalism of the peasant, in its traditional form or its regressive form, and the ethos bound up with it cannot fail to come into conflict with the effort to set up a rational organization of production and of the relations of production. It follows that considerations of economic rationality as much as the revolutionary exaltation of the spirit de sacrifice necessarily lead to battling against the resurgence of the most deeply rooted cultural traditions, such as the clan spirit or nepotism, which obstruct the rational management of the undertaking, by giving rise to conflicts or by encouraging the withdrawal of each economic unit into itself.
